

19 November 1958

For Komer

From Cremeans

Subj. Comment on attached Memo

1. May I apologize in advance for being in a captious mood, but this piece of paper does not appeal to me.
2. Re para 1: This was well known before the ME and Taiwan Straits crises of the past few months. True, we ought to do a better job at this, but the root of the trouble is in policy decisions which get us all tied up in affairs with declining regimes in such a way as to make development of the opposition difficult. ~~Indiscreet~~
3. Para 2: Laudable goal, but the mil atts and MAAGS, though they can be exploited a bit more effectively are exactly the boys who aren't going to learn anything about those obscure middle level officers.
Para 4:
4. / Egypt's success in propaganda and subversion against Western interests has almost nothing to do with the absence of means of preventing or counteracting subversion in friendly states. Nuri had the best possible apparatus. Spending ~~money~~ money on better means would have been a waste, ~~if that~~ Our vulnerabilities and Iraq's vulnerabilities were based on policy and couldn't have been covered up by intelligence.
5. Para 3: A waste of the taxpayers money. How in hell are we going to assess popular moods in the Sudan, Tunisia, Thailand or wherever in such a way as to assist the local governments when we don't have the requisite skills to do it for ourselves?
6. Para 5: Our propaganda is nearly the worst in the world. What have we got to offer.
7. Forgive me again for captiousness, but it is so seldom that I

can indulge myself in the manner of a Board member or an Agency Rep and
hack at someone else's prose. Also in the manner of the types aforementioned,
I have little to offer in the way of constructive suggestion, very little.

I offer
Such as it is, ~~like~~ the following:

A. The recent crises didn't reveal shortcomings in our intelligence system, and only to a limited degree in our intelligence performance.

B. The mistakes we made in connection with these crises were ~~not mistakes that we could have been expected to have made in intelligence collection~~
likely to have been remedied or avoided if we had had better intelligence collection, better requirements, or the like.

C. The chances of our knowing the names and numbers of the officers involved in the Iraqi coup would have been negligible even if we had quadrupled our Military Attache representation, and having that particular bit of information would not have stopped Nuri from getting his, sooner or later.

D. The most important mistakes were made ~~at~~ right here in ONE and around the Agency Reps table where we might have made clearer the facts that were staring us all in the face, namely that the public throughout the area was against Nuri and the US and for Gamal. Or maybe ~~these~~ the most important mistakes were made by those who didn't think our intelligence analyses indicated any need for a change in our posture.

E. In short, we got what we asked for in Iraq and there aren't many conclusions to be drawn about intelligence. As for Taiwan, ask somebody else.